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	<title>Kommentare zu: One Yubikey to rule them all</title>
	<atom:link href="http://dennisbloete.de/blog/one-yubikey-to-rule-them-all/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://dennisbloete.de/blog/one-yubikey-to-rule-them-all/</link>
	<description>Arbeit und Alltag eines Software-Entwicklers aus Bremen</description>
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		<title>Von: Dennis</title>
		<link>http://dennisbloete.de/blog/one-yubikey-to-rule-them-all/comment-page-1/#comment-33221</link>
		<dc:creator>Dennis</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 11 Sep 2008 11:28:40 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.dopefreshtight.de/?p=274#comment-33221</guid>
		<description>Hey Paul, you can find all the necessary links in &lt;a href=&quot;http://blog.dopefreshtight.de/artikel/rails-openid-server-masquerade/&quot;&gt;this article&lt;/a&gt;.

Dennis</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hey Paul, you can find all the necessary links in <a href="http://blog.dopefreshtight.de/artikel/rails-openid-server-masquerade/">this article</a>.</p>
<p>Dennis</p>
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		<title>Von: Paul Chen</title>
		<link>http://dennisbloete.de/blog/one-yubikey-to-rule-them-all/comment-page-1/#comment-33220</link>
		<dc:creator>Paul Chen</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 11 Sep 2008 00:45:11 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.dopefreshtight.de/?p=274#comment-33220</guid>
		<description>You mentioned about your Ruby OpenID server, where is that? Can I try it out? I&#039;m looking for such a thing in Ruby.

Thanks

Paul @ Yubico</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>You mentioned about your Ruby OpenID server, where is that? Can I try it out? I&#8217;m looking for such a thing in Ruby.</p>
<p>Thanks</p>
<p>Paul @ Yubico</p>
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		<title>Von: Boris</title>
		<link>http://dennisbloete.de/blog/one-yubikey-to-rule-them-all/comment-page-1/#comment-32077</link>
		<dc:creator>Boris</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 27 May 2008 15:49:17 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.dopefreshtight.de/?p=274#comment-32077</guid>
		<description>I answer myself: http://yubico.com/faq/index/ -- Search for &quot;OATH-Compliant&quot;</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I answer myself: <a href="http://yubico.com/faq/index/" rel="nofollow"></a><a href='http://yubico.com/faq/index/'>http://yubico.com/faq/index/</a> &#8212; Search for &#8220;OATH-Compliant&#8221;</p>
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		<title>Von: Boris</title>
		<link>http://dennisbloete.de/blog/one-yubikey-to-rule-them-all/comment-page-1/#comment-32076</link>
		<dc:creator>Boris</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 27 May 2008 15:35:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.dopefreshtight.de/?p=274#comment-32076</guid>
		<description>Well, it would be interesting to know if the basic technology behind this was RFC 4226 (or even its successor http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-mraihi-totp-timebased-00.txt, for more information see http://www.openauthentication.org/specifications)

We thought about implementing that one about a year or so ago, but still think, that it&#039;s a bad idea that every provider comes with a seperate OTP device.

OTOH, Encrypting the yubikey DB is a hard one</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Well, it would be interesting to know if the basic technology behind this was RFC 4226 (or even its successor <a href="http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-mraihi-totp-timebased-00.txt" rel="nofollow"></a><a href='http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-mraihi-totp-timebased-00.txt'>http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-mraihi-totp-timebased-00.txt</a>, for more information see <a href="http://www.openauthentication.org/specifications)" rel="nofollow"></a><a href='http://www.openauthentication.org/specifications'>http://www.openauthentication.org/specifications</a>)</p>
<p>We thought about implementing that one about a year or so ago, but still think, that it&#8217;s a bad idea that every provider comes with a seperate OTP device.</p>
<p>OTOH, Encrypting the yubikey DB is a hard one</p>
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		<title>Von: links for 2008-05-27 &#171; Breyten&#8217;s Dev Blog</title>
		<link>http://dennisbloete.de/blog/one-yubikey-to-rule-them-all/comment-page-1/#comment-32065</link>
		<dc:creator>links for 2008-05-27 &#171; Breyten&#8217;s Dev Blog</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 27 May 2008 11:31:07 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.dopefreshtight.de/?p=274#comment-32065</guid>
		<description>[...] One Yubikey to rule them all (tags: off-topic masquerade openid security yubico yubikey) [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] One Yubikey to rule them all (tags: off-topic masquerade openid security yubico yubikey) [...]</p>
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		<title>Von: stffn</title>
		<link>http://dennisbloete.de/blog/one-yubikey-to-rule-them-all/comment-page-1/#comment-32064</link>
		<dc:creator>stffn</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 27 May 2008 10:48:42 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.dopefreshtight.de/?p=274#comment-32064</guid>
		<description>Ah, found it: 
http://www.yubico.com/files/YubiKey_Security_Review.pdf 

&quot;The server stores the encryption keys and passwords for all users, and is thus a single point of failure. A successful attack on the server, e.g., a physical server attack or cracker attack, will compromise the entire system. The attacker will be able to masquerade as any user. The recovery procedure from
this attack includes replacing all user devices (or possibly do a software upgrade of them).&quot;

Not so nice.  So, the key database needs to be seriously protected.  Higher stake in case of a server attack with the keys in clear text in the database.  Reduces the attractiveness of running such a service on your own.

Man-in-the-Middle and key logger attacks stay dangerous with yubikey as well. Still, nice method of circumventing some social engineering attacks with a low-cost token.  I&#039;m eager to see if yubikey will spread.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Ah, found it:<br />
<a href="http://www.yubico.com/files/YubiKey_Security_Review.pdf" rel="nofollow"></a><a href='http://www.yubico.com/files/YubiKey_Security_Review.pdf'>http://www.yubico.com/files/YubiKey_Security_Review.pdf</a> </p>
<p>&#8220;The server stores the encryption keys and passwords for all users, and is thus a single point of failure. A successful attack on the server, e.g., a physical server attack or cracker attack, will compromise the entire system. The attacker will be able to masquerade as any user. The recovery procedure from<br />
this attack includes replacing all user devices (or possibly do a software upgrade of them).&#8221;</p>
<p>Not so nice.  So, the key database needs to be seriously protected.  Higher stake in case of a server attack with the keys in clear text in the database.  Reduces the attractiveness of running such a service on your own.</p>
<p>Man-in-the-Middle and key logger attacks stay dangerous with yubikey as well. Still, nice method of circumventing some social engineering attacks with a low-cost token.  I&#8217;m eager to see if yubikey will spread.</p>
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		<title>Von: stffn</title>
		<link>http://dennisbloete.de/blog/one-yubikey-to-rule-them-all/comment-page-1/#comment-32062</link>
		<dc:creator>stffn</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 27 May 2008 10:32:04 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.dopefreshtight.de/?p=274#comment-32062</guid>
		<description>http://yubico.com/technology/description/ says &quot;Together, these fields are encrypted using a 128-bit key.&quot;  I haven&#039;t found a word yet on where the mentioned 128-bit key comes from.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://yubico.com/technology/description/" rel="nofollow"></a><a href='http://yubico.com/technology/description/'>http://yubico.com/technology/description/</a> says &#8220;Together, these fields are encrypted using a 128-bit key.&#8221;  I haven&#8217;t found a word yet on where the mentioned 128-bit key comes from.</p>
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	<item>
		<title>Von: Kick Willemse</title>
		<link>http://dennisbloete.de/blog/one-yubikey-to-rule-them-all/comment-page-1/#comment-32061</link>
		<dc:creator>Kick Willemse</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 27 May 2008 10:27:05 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.dopefreshtight.de/?p=274#comment-32061</guid>
		<description>Hi, nice post with good details. I think I check on this Yubikey myself.

I have 1 question on the way you check wether the login is a Yubikey or not looking at the length of the password. 

Did you think about checking the username entered within the application and see what authentication mechanism is related. 

In the end the RP&#039;s still need to link their application uid to the authentication ID. In general this mechanism could help the RP&#039;s to have just one login screen asking for the username. (In stead of having a login for all different authentication mechanisms.)</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hi, nice post with good details. I think I check on this Yubikey myself.</p>
<p>I have 1 question on the way you check wether the login is a Yubikey or not looking at the length of the password. </p>
<p>Did you think about checking the username entered within the application and see what authentication mechanism is related. </p>
<p>In the end the RP&#8217;s still need to link their application uid to the authentication ID. In general this mechanism could help the RP&#8217;s to have just one login screen asking for the username. (In stead of having a login for all different authentication mechanisms.)</p>
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		<title>Von: stffn</title>
		<link>http://dennisbloete.de/blog/one-yubikey-to-rule-them-all/comment-page-1/#comment-32060</link>
		<dc:creator>stffn</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 27 May 2008 10:25:59 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.dopefreshtight.de/?p=274#comment-32060</guid>
		<description>Any serious analysis out there about how the security really works?  From the yubico&#039;s website I cannot deduct where the AES key for encrypting the OTP base data comes from.  Is it a pre-shared key?  Does the service provider stores those of each yubikey token?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Any serious analysis out there about how the security really works?  From the yubico&#8217;s website I cannot deduct where the AES key for encrypting the OTP base data comes from.  Is it a pre-shared key?  Does the service provider stores those of each yubikey token?</p>
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